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Neurotypical individuals cope flexibly with the full range of semantic relations expressed in
human language, including metaphoric relations. This impressive semantic ability may be
associated with distinct and flexible patterns of hemispheric interaction, including higher
right hemisphere (RH) involvement for processing novel metaphors. However, this ability
may be impaired in specific clinical conditions, such as Asperger syndrome (AS) and
schizophrenia. The impaired semantic processing is accompanied by different patterns of
hemispheric interaction during semantic processing, showing either reduced (in Asperger
syndrome) or excessive (in schizophrenia) RH involvement. This paper interprets these
individual differences using the terms Rigidity, Chaos and Integration, which describe
patterns of semantic memory network states that either lead to semantic well-being or
are disruptive of it. We argue that these semantic network states lie on a rigidity-chaos
semantic continuum. We define these terms via network science terminology and provide
network, cognitive and neural evidence to support our claim. This continuum includes left
hemisphere (LH) hyper-rigid semantic memory state on one end (e.g., in persons with AS),
and RH chaotic and over-flexible semantic memory state on the other end (e.g., in persons
with schizophrenia). In between these two extremes lie different states of semantic
memory structure which are related to individual differences in semantic creativity.
We suggest that efficient semantic processing is achieved by semantic integration, a
balance between semantic rigidity and semantic chaos. Such integration is achieved
via intra-hemispheric communication. However, impairments to this well-balanced and
integrated pattern of hemispheric interaction, e.g., when one hemisphere dominates the
other, may lead to either semantic rigidity or semantic chaos, moving away from semantic
integration and thus impairing the processing of metaphoric language.
Keywords: metaphors, creative language, cerebral hemispheres, network science, chaos, rigidity, integration
INTRODUCTION
Language is complex. Part of this complexity is the unique
characteristic of human language that contains highly conven-
tional as well as unconventional, more ambiguous and cre-
ative linguistic expressions such as novel metaphors (Faust,
2012; Mirous and Beeman, 2012). In the present paper we sug-
gest that the ability of neurologically intact persons to cope
flexibly with the full range of semantic relations expressed in
language, including novel metaphoric relations, depends on
the pattern of interaction between multiple brain networks
in the two cerebral hemispheres during semantic processing.
Specifically, we suggest that language is always a whole brain
process and thus processing any type of language, including
metaphors, requires integration between systemized, more rigid
semantic processing associated with the left hemisphere (LH)
and more flexible semantic processing associated with the right
hemisphere (RH). However, when compared to more con-
ventional types of language, processing novel metaphors may
require relatively higher involvement of RH unique semantic
coding.
The two cerebral hemispheres have been shown to code
semantic information in different ways (for review see Mirous
and Beeman, 2012). Much research indicates that RH mecha-
nisms are highly sensitive to distant, unusual semantic relations,
whereas LH mechanisms strongly focus on a few closely related
word meanings while suppressing distant and unusual mean-
ings (Brownell et al., 1983; Burgess and Simpson, 1988; Faust
and Chiarello, 1998; Razoumnikova, 2000; Faust and Kahana,
2002; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003; Faust and Lavidor,
2003; Mihov et al., 2010; Faust, 2012). The interaction between
these two semantic systems can thus be described as lying on
a rigidity-chaos semantic continuum. This continuum includes
LH hyper-rigid and rule-based semantic processing on one
extreme (e.g., in persons with Asperger syndrome (AS)), and
RH chaotic and over-flexible semantic activation on the other
extreme (e.g., in persons with schizophrenia). However, moving
away from both LH semantic rigidity and RH semantic chaos
leads to hemispheric well-balanced cooperation and to semantic
integration. We suggest that this integration enables neurologi-
cally intact persons to process unconventional and ambiguous
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language, including both conventional and novel metaphoric
expressions. Furthermore, we suggest that the level of semantic
integration may be related to individual differences in creative
ability.
Metaphors are considered to be part of the more creative
aspects of language as they may require unusual semantic pro-
cessing. Creativity is broadly defined as the creation of something
which is both novel and useful, or appropriate (Mednick, 1962;
Sternberg and Lubart, 1999; Runco and Jaeger, 2012). By this
definition, a creative product is the combination of a flexible
process, which allows generation of novel ideas, with a more
systemized process which constrains novel concepts by their
appropriateness (Nijstad et al., 2010). In line with this definition,
creative language includes linguistic products which are both
novel and appropriate, such as novel metaphors. Metaphors,
including novel metaphoric expressions, are abundant in lan-
guage (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), as they allow efficient expres-
sions of ideas that would otherwise be awkward to explain
literally (Glucksberg, 2001). However, the use of metaphoric
language requires the ability to activate a broader, more flex-
ible set of semantic associations and combine weakly related
concepts into a novel and appropriate linguistic product (i.e.,
sense creation, Bowdle and Gentner, 2005; Faust, 2012). Thus,
metaphors are widely used in poetry, the ultimate expression of
linguistic creativity, where with a few words, implicit and explicit
emotions and associations from one context can powerfully be
associated in a novel way with another, different context (Faust,
2012).
We have been working for the past two decades on processing
of novel metaphors taken from poetry compared to conventional
metaphors, literal expressions, and meaningless, unrelated word-
pairs (reviewd in Faust, 2012). This research project used con-
verging behavioral and neurocognitive techniques (accuracy and
response times, split visual fields, Evoked Response Potentials
(ERPs), Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging and Magnetoencephalography) to study neu-
rotypical as well as clinical populations, such as persons with AS
or schizophrenia (Faust, 2012; Gold and Faust, 2012; Zeev-Wolf
et al., 2014).
This research project has consistently shown the contribution
of the RH to novel metaphor processing in neurotypical persons
and how deviation from a neurotypical state affects comprehen-
sion of novel metaphors (i.e., the processing of creative language):
on one extreme, persons with AS exhibit rigidity of thought
and have difficulties in processing novel conceptual combinations
(novel metaphors) accompanied with reduced RH involvement
(Gold and Faust, 2012); on the other extreme, persons with
schizophrenia exhibiting loose associations, seem to have a differ-
ent pattern of hemispheric involvement, including increased RH
involvement. This different hemispheric pattern may result in the
processing of unrelated word pairs as with meanings (Zeev-Wolf
et al., 2014). Furthermore, the different patterns of hemispheric
involvement in semantic processing characterizing persons with
neurodevelopmental psychiatric disorders may be related to their
documented deficits in the comprehension of nonliteral expres-
sions while other language skills are relatively preserved (Martin
and McDonald, 2004; Thoma and Daum, 2006; Rapp, 2012) [but
see Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit (2012) for an alternative view
on persons with AS].
The role of the RH in creative language is explained by the
fine-coarse semantic processing model (FCT; Chiarello, 2003;
Jung-Beeman, 2005) and is based on the notion that the RH
uniquely activates and maintains a wide range of meanings
and associations that enable the creation of novel conceptual
combinations. This weak broad activation may better capture
semantic relations which depend on the overlap of distantly
related meanings. According to this theory, both hemispheres
are involved in Bilateral semantic Access, Integration, and Selec-
tion (BAIS; Jung-Beeman, 2005), yet with a different process-
ing role for each hemisphere. This difference implies different
hemispheric mechanisms for metaphorical and literal language.
When people comprehend literal language, the LH is strongly
involved because the meaning is dominant, focal, and con-
textually relevant. However when people process metaphorical
language, specifically novel metaphors; the RH plays a more
important role because the figurative meaning of metaphors
requires activations of loosely related concepts in a broader
semantic field. The FCT has supporting neural evidence at
both morphological and micro-anatomical levels (Mirous and
Beeman, 2012). At the morphological level, there are a few
distinct asymmetries between the LH and the RH, such as
the LH having a larger temporal plane and a relatively higher
ratio of gray to white matter and the RH having relatively
more white matter and a higher degree of functional inter-
connectivity. At the micro-anatomical level, LH neurons have
smaller input fields than RH neurons in language related brain
areas. This difference in input fields may be related to more
specific, fine, neural processing in the LH compared to less
specific, coarser processing in the RH (Mirous and Beeman,
2012).
Several studies using functional Magnetic Resonance Imag-
ing (fMRI) techniques to investigate hemispheric processing of
metaphors have been conducted (Mashal et al., 2005; Schmidt
and Seger, 2009; Yang et al., 2009; Diaz and Hogstrom, 2011;
Diaz et al., 2011; Bohrn et al., 2012). Such studies show the
involvement and contribution of the RH in processing novel
metaphors and figurative language and how this involvement is
affected by context, novelty, figurativeness, task difficulty and
familiarity (Schmidt and Seger, 2009; Yang et al., 2009; Diaz
and Hogstrom, 2011; Diaz et al., 2011). However, while much
research has shown the role of the RH in metaphor processing,
contradicting findings showing no RH role in metaphor pro-
cessing and even LH dominance have also been reported (Rapp,
2012). Recent meta-analyses of several fMRI investigations of
neural aspects of metaphor processing have yielded both LH
and RH dominant activations (Rapp et al., 2012; Yang, 2014).
Rapp et al. (2012) found more left-lateralized temporal net-
work activation for processing non-literal language. Neverthe-
less, when the authors conducted subgroup analysis for different
types of non-literal language types, they found more general
bilateral and even more RH activated foci for non-salient, novel
metaphor processing. Thus, this meta-analysis further strength-
ens the importance of bilateral hemispheric dynamics in the
processing of non-literal language. Yang (2014) conducted an
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fMRI meta-analysis to investigate the role of the RH and the
brain mechanisms involved in metaphor comprehension. This
meta-analysis revealed that the RH is involved in metaphor
comprehension and is influenced by conventionality, context
and task demand. These factors might explain the contradicting
evidence found in regard to the role of the RH in metaphor
processing (Rapp, 2012). Furthermore, this meta-analysis related
each of the three semantic processing components proposed
by Jung-Beeman (2005) to neural activity, mainly the temporal
lobe (medial temporal gyrus (MTG)/superior temporal gyrus
(STG)) to semantic activation and integration and the frontal
lobe (inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)) to semantic selection. Each
component seems to involve bilateral brain regions activation,
while RH regions perform coarser analysis than LH regions for
the same process (Yang, 2014). Thus, while the role of the RH
in metaphor processing is consistently shown, the importance
of bilateral activation and hemispheric cooperation in creative
and metaphoric language processing is becoming more and more
apparent.
Evidence for bilateral activation in hemispheric processing
of metaphors is slowly accumulating. Pobric et al. (2007) used
repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) to study
hemispheric involvement in semantic processing. They show that
while RH interference only disrupted novel metaphor processing,
LH interference disrupted literal and conventional metaphor pro-
cessing, but facilitated novel metaphor processing (Pobric et al.,
2007). These findings suggest that processing novel metaphoric
relations requires dynamical, fine-tuned interaction between RH
coarse and LH fine semantic processing mechanisms. Further-
more, it has been suggested that the corpus callosum mediates
the processing of non-literal language such as metaphors, by the
integration of relevant information between hemispheres (Thoma
and Daum, 2006). Thoma and Daum (2006) show how persons
suffering from agenesis of the corpus callosum (a congenital
disease which results in complete or partial absence of the corpus
callosum) are impaired in non-literal language processing.
These findings thus suggest a cognitive continuum which
settles the contradicting evidence for hemispheric roles and inter-
action during metaphor processing and may provide a more
general account for different patterns of neurocognitive pro-
cessing of creative, including metaphoric, language exhibited
by clinical and neurotypical persons (Gold et al., 2011; Gold
and Faust, 2012; Zeev-Wolf et al., 2014). The continuum we
propose here is a cognitive continuum of semantic processing
states, ranging from rigidity to chaos. We borrow the notions
of rigidity, chaos and integration from Siegel (2010) who uses
these terms to describe psychological well-being and proposes a
framework of semantic well-being. We will define the notions of
semantic rigidity, chaos and integration and describe how network
science allows for quantitative explorations of these notions.
This is achieved by describing neural, computational and cogni-
tive research in order to discuss the extreme states of semantic
rigidity (via research on persons with AS) and semantic chaos
(via research on persons with schizophrenia). Finally, we discuss
semantic integration, which we have been recently exploring
through the investigation of individual differences in semantic
creativity.
SEMANTIC WELL-BEING—RIGIDITY, CHAOS AND
INTEGRATION
In presenting an integrative explanation for the psychological
state of well-being, Siegel (2010) introduces the notions of rigid-
ity, chaos and integration. As he sees it, emotional well-being is
a state of integrative balance, leading to feelings of vitality and
livelihood. The claim is that this balance is easily disrupted by
deviation either towards too little arousal, a state of rigidity, or
excessive arousal, a state of chaos (Siegel, 2010). This deviation
from mental balance occurs frequently in mentally healthy per-
sons, but extreme deviations can result in clinical conditions.
Siegel claims that the key to mental balance is integration—
linking together different elements from different system, which
converges into a balanced synchrony, such as that of a singing
choir in harmony (Siegel, 2010). Thus, emotional well-being is
considered a balance of systems that integrate with each other and
mental illness can be defined as a shift from a state of integration
either to a rigid extreme or to a chaotic extreme. Searching for a
theoretical framework to relate these notions, Siegel realized that
network science allows quantitative definition and exploration of
his theory of mental well-being (Siegel, 2010). In this paper, we
used network science tools to quantify semantic rigidity, chaos
and well-being and relate these processing modes to hemispheric
involvement.
Network science is based on mathematical graph theory, pro-
viding quantitative methods to investigate complex systems as
networks. A network is composed from nodes, which represent
the basic unit of the system and links that represent the rela-
tions between them. This field has greatly advanced in the past
few decades due to technological and quantitative theoretical
advances. This rapid development has led to investigations of
both properties (structural) and dynamics (such as emotional
deviation from integration) of complex systems which can be
represented as networks (reviewed in Baronchelli et al., 2013). Of
the various network models developed in network science theory,
the network model that has been widely used to examine complex
systems is the Small World Network model (SWN; Milgram,
1967; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). SWN models have successfully
described a wide range of sociological, technological, biological
and economical networks (Boccaletti et al., 2006; Cohen and
Havlin, 2010; Kenett et al., 2010; Newman, 2010). Two main
characteristics of SWN are the networks clustering coefficient
(CC) and its average shortest path length (ASPL). The CC refers
to the probability that two neighbors (a neighbor is a node j that
is connected through an edge to node i) of a node will themselves
be neighbors. The ASPL refers to the average shortest amount of
steps (nodes being traversed) needed to be taken between any pair
of nodes. A SWN is characterized by having a large CC and a short
ASPL.
At the cognitive level, application of network science tools is
also developing, mainly to investigate complex systems of lan-
guage and memory structure (Vitevitch, 2008; Borge-Holthoefer
and Arenas, 2010; Chan and Vitevitch, 2010; Vitevitch et al.,
2012, 2014; Baronchelli et al., 2013). In the linguistic domain,
lexicons of different languages seem to display SWN charac-
teristics, considered to be a fundamental principle in lexical
organization (Steyvers and Tenenbaum, 2005; De-Deyne and
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Storms, 2008a,b; Borge-Holthoefer and Arenas, 2010; Kenett
et al., 2011). Investigating the complexity of semantic knowl-
edge with network science allows to uniquely examine funda-
mental questions such as the nature of semantic organization
(what are the structural principles that characterize seman-
tic knowledge?), process and performance (to what extent can
human performance on semantic processing tasks be explained
in terms of general processing in semantic memory network?)
and typical and atypical semantic lexicon development (Steyvers
and Tenenbaum, 2005; Beckage et al., 2011; Kenett et al.,
2013). Network research in language is slowly shifting from
an interest in investigating the structure of mental lexicons
to investigating cognitive processes operating on these lexicon
networks (reviewd in Borge-Holthoefer and Arenas, 2010). To
date, no network model has been proposed to explain differ-
ences in creative language processing and specifically metaphor
processing, both in healthy and clinical populations. Such a
model must be able to provide a network based explana-
tion and predictions to the differences found in a wide range
of creative language processing modes, including metaphor
comprehension.
A central concept in network theory is the random graph. A
random graph is generally defined as any graph in which some
parameters are fixed and some parameters are unconstrained,
thus random (Newman, 2010). Random graphs were extensively
studied by Erdös and Rényi, who defined a general model for a
random graph (Erdös and Rényi, 1960). In their model, a graph
consists of nodes (N) and a certain probability for the existence
of a link between these two nodes (L), which is drawn via a
Poisson distribution. This probability ranges from 0, where all
of the nodes are disconnected from each other, to 1, where all
of the nodes are connected to each other. Thus, having a fixed
(N, L) results in a spectrum of different networks which vary
in their connectivity patterns. It is important to note that the
randomness of this model is based on its fixed parameters and
that the model’s simplicity does not accurately model real world
networks (Sporns, 2011). To better account for real world network
properties (namely, high CC and low ASPL), Watts and Strogatz
proposed a “small-world” random graph model (SW; Watts and
Strogatz, 1998). Given a fixed number of nodes (N), fixed average
degree (K; amount of nodes connected to a specific node i) and
a probability parameter (p), a SW random graph is constructed
in the following way: first, a regular network is constructed with
N nodes connected to K neighbors. Next, every edge between
a pair of nodes is rewired with a probability of p. Rewiring is
defined as changing a link from connecting node i and node j, to
connecting node i and node k. The rewiring process reshapes the
structure of the random network such that it better represents real
world networks (as described above). Such random graph models
provide a quantitative framework to study different structural
organizations of complex systems with a fixed number of nodes,
such as brain networks or mental lexicons. In this sense, it is
possible to examine how a varying degree of connectivity, which
is brought about by variation in L affects cognitive processing and
predicts individual differences and atypical cognitive conditions.
We argue for a continuum of different mental lexicon states
which constrains creative language including metaphor process-
ing. This semantic continuum ranges from a mental lexicon
state with extremely low connectivity (resulting in more ordered,
rigid organization) to a mental lexicon state with extremely high
connectivity (resulting in more random, chaotic organization)
(Figure 1). In between lies a family of lexicon network states with
varying connectivity structure, such as Barabasi-Albert or scale
free networks (Cohen and Havlin, 2010). We suggest that a mental
lexicon state which balances between these two extremes allows
for an efficient processing of both conventional and creative
language and also for the differentiation between these language
types and meaningless linguistic expressions.
SEMANTIC RIGIDITY
On one extreme of the semantic continuum are rigid net-
works. Such rigid networks are strongly ordered and minimally
random, thus exhibiting a low CC and a high ASPL. Classi-
cal computational cognitive models which were proposed in
the 1960’s to represent semantic memory are one such exam-
ple (i.e., Collins and Quillian, 1969). Such models were struc-
tured tree-based representations and were criticized for their
inability to account for flexible categorization (Rogers, 2008;
FIGURE 1 | A simulated example of the semantic continuum. In this
simulated example, 10 nodes are presented with varying connectivity
patterns ranging from a rigid organization (extreme left) where each node
is connected to only one other node, to a chaotic organization (extreme
right) where each node is connected to all other nodes. In between lies a
more integrated state (center) where part of the nodes are connected to
few other nodes (rigidity) and a few nodes are connected to many other
nodes.
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Borge-Holthoefer and Arenas, 2010). Since metaphor process-
ing requires the activation of wide, flexible associative networks
(Faust, 2012), we propose that such rigid networks are inefficient
in facilitating creative language processing. A distinctive example
of how rigidity of thought disrupts creative language processing is
found in persons with AS.
While persons with AS display relatively intact formal lin-
guistic processing (syntax, morphology, phonology), they exhibit
extensive difficulties in higher-level aspects of linguistic process-
ing (Gold and Faust, 2012). Studies have shown that persons with
AS show difficulty in understanding non-literal language, such
as semantically ambiguous (Le Sourn-Bissaoui et al., 2011) and
metaphoric (Gillberg and Gillberg, 1989; Gold et al., 2010; Gold
and Faust, 2010, 2012) language.
Recent neural research in autism points to white matter
deficiencies leading to disrupted connectivity, as suggested by
the under-connectivity theory of autism (Just et al., 2004, 2012;
Williams et al., 2013). This theory postulates that connectivity of
inter-regional brain circuitry is disrupted, particularly affecting
cognitive processes which demand integration of frontal-
posterior brain interactions. This under-connectivity in autism
has been shown in various cognitive processes, specifically in
language comprehension (Just et al., 2004, 2012; Williams et al.,
2013). McAlonan et al. (2009) investigated white matter deficits
in children with AS and found that they have predominantly
right sided white matter deficits, but also greater white matter
volume than controls in LH language areas. Finally, Boger-
Megiddo et al. (2006) have shown that children with autism
have a disproportionately smaller corpus callosum volumes than
typically developing controls.
These findings were further corroborated by functional and
neuro-structural studies (Koshino et al., 2005; Nordahl et al.,
2007) and converge with electrophysiological evidence showing
disrupted RH for processing novel metaphors by persons with
AS (Gold and Faust, 2010; Gold et al., 2010). Such electrophys-
iological research found no differences in the ERPs for processing
novel metaphors compared to processing unrelated word pairs,
in contrast to neurotypical controls. Thus, when persons with AS
processed novel metaphoric and unrelated two word expressions,
their N400 amplitudes did not differ, suggesting that they process
novel, potentially meaningful semantic relations, as if they are
meaningless. In addition, when persons with AS processed con-
ventional and novel metaphors their N400 amplitudes were sig-
nificantly more negative compared to neurotypical controls. No
such difference was found in the N400 amplitude for processing
literal or unrelated meanings in persons with AS. These findings
suggest that for persons with AS, integration of novel metaphoric
meanings is as difficult as the integration of unrelated, nonsensical
meanings. The findings may thus provide electrophysiological
evidence for the specific difficulties exhibited by persons with AS
in processing creative language such as novel metaphors (Gold
et al., 2010).
At the cognitive level, Gold and Faust (2012) have attempted
to explain the difficulties in processing metaphoric language
typically exhibited by persons with AS by extending the
Empathizing-Systemizing theory proposed by Baron-Cohen
(2009). This perspective argues that in the language domain,
conventional language processing is rule-based and thus
considered the more systemized part of semantic processing,
which remains intact in persons with AS. Creative language
processing, on the other-hand, involves some degree of
semantic rule-violation strategies, such as the ability to violate
conventional, dominant semantic relations and connect remote
associations into a new and appropriate linguistic product. As
such, the authors argue that creative language processing can be
considered similar to the Empathic system, in the sense that is it
much less rule-based, thus the processing of this type of language
may be disrupted in persons with AS (Gold and Faust, 2012).
We have recently applied a network science research, inves-
tigating the structure of semantic memory of persons with AS
compared to neurotypical controls (Kenett et al., under review).
We show that the semantic memory structure of persons with AS
is more compartmentalized than that of neurotypical controls—
it breaks apart into smaller sub-parts. Community structure is
extensively studied in network science, known as modularity
(Newman, 2006; Fortunato, 2010; Meunier et al., 2010). The prin-
ciple of modularity seems to be a fundamental principle of brain
network organization and modularity disruption has been related
to neurodegenerative diseases (Bullmore and Sporns, 2012). We
claim that the hyper-modular structure of semantic memory in
persons with AS is related to their rigidity of thought. We suggest
that the hyper-modular mental lexicon network organization may
hinder their ability to break apart from a specific module in the
network and is thus related to their rigidity of thought.
In summary, we suggest that a systemized, highly conventional
and relatively rigid processing is crucial for efficient processing of
the more conventional, rule-based parts of language, associated
with the LH. Nevertheless, extreme states of rigid semantic pro-
cessing may disrupt the ability to process the more creative aspects
of language, associated with higher RH involvement, as evident
in persons with AS. Neural, behavioral and network research in
persons with AS is beginning to converge to a possibly more
coherent explanation of the difficulties such persons exhibit in
processing the more creative types of language such as novel
metaphors. Such difficulties may be related to an extremely rigid
semantic system state, most likely as a result of neural under-
connectivity which disrupts their ability for flexible semantic
processing. Research on the effect of network rigidity on cognitive
processing has only recently begun and requires much further
research to better understand this effect (Arenas et al., 2012;
Shai et al., 2014). We now turn to the other extreme end of the
semantic state continuum—the chaotic state.
SEMANTIC CHAOS
On the other extreme of the semantic continuum lies chaotic
state. In network science terms, chaotic networks can be defined
as being random, or nearly random—high CC and very low ASPL,
marking a network which is very highly connected and very little
organized. Current neurocognitive studies which applied network
science tools to investigate the developing brain have shown
that brain network structures reorganize from an initial chaotic
SWN state to a more structured network state (Boersma et al.,
2011; Fan et al., 2011; Yap et al., 2011; de Bie et al., 2012; Smit
et al., 2012; van Straaten and Stam, 2013). These studies provide
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neurophysiological evidence that complex brain networks start
from a more chaotic, strongly small-worlded state, and slowly,
as the brain matures, shift to a more structured state, while
retaining SWN properties. Thus, in accordance with Siegel (2010)
notion of well-being, the brain transgresses from a chaotic state
to a more structured, balanced state. In fact, network research in
neurodegenerative diseases show how such diseases alter healthy
network states (van Straaten and Stam, 2013). Schizophrenia is a
distinctive disease that results in altered neurocognitive network
states.
Application of network science to EEG and fMRI data of
individuals with schizophrenia has revealed loss of overall func-
tional connectivity and small-world properties with increased
network randomness (Micheloyannis et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2008;
Rubinov et al., 2009; Lynall et al., 2010). Several fMRI studies
have reported reduced clustering and reduced modularity in
patients with schizophrenia (Liu et al., 2008; Alexander-Bloch
et al., 2010), all supporting the network randomization theory of
schizophrenia (Rubinov et al., 2009). Furthermore the severity of
the disruption of the small-world structure of the brain seems to
be related to the duration of the illness (Liu et al., 2008; Rubinov
et al., 2009).
We have recently conducted behavioral and MEG research
to investigate metaphor processing in persons with schizophre-
nia compared to neurotypical controls (Zeev-Wolf et al., 2014;
Zeev-Wolf et al., in preparation). This research showed how
the ability to differentiate between potentially meaningful, novel
metaphoric expressions and meaningless word pairs may be defi-
cient in persons with schizophrenia. Persons with schizophrenia
appear to over-rely on coarse semantic coding, which may dis-
rupt their ability to balance between finding new meanings to
novel metaphors, on the one hand, and rejecting meaningless
linguistic stimuli on the other hand. This was accompanied by
a different pattern of hemispheric involvement during the pro-
cessing of linguistic expressions. Specifically, we found a deficient
pattern of RH excessive involvement for all types of expres-
sions, mainly to novel metaphors, in persons with schizophrenia
compared to neurotypical controls. Thus, at short c1 stimulus
onset asynchrony (SOAS), while neurotypical persons exhibited
a LH advantage for novel metaphor processing, persons with
schizophrenia exhibited RH advantage. Furthermore, while neu-
rotypical controls exhibited a LH advantage for processing literal
and conventional metaphors, persons with schizophrenia exhib-
ited a RH advantage (Zeev-Wolf et al., 2014). The MEG research
provided further evidence for the unbalanced relations between
hemispheres in processing novel metaphors. We found a gen-
eral RH over-activation and unbalanced hemispheric activation
during metaphor comprehension, as compared to neurotypical
controls (Zeev-Wolf et al., in preparation).
At the cognitive level, network research investigating language
and thought disorders in persons with schizophrenia is only ini-
tially developing (Mota et al., 2012; Voorspoels et al., 2014). Mota
et al. (2012) used network tools to study speech acts produced by
manic and schizophrenic patients, by creating speech graphs for
each clinical population (Mota et al., 2012). This research shows
how quantitative network measures can differentiate between
persons with schizophrenia (by quantitatively accounting for the
schizophrenic phenomena of “poverty of speech”), manic patients
(by quantitatively accounting for the manic phenomena of “flight
of speech”) and neurotypical controls, providing valuable clinical
information not measured by classical clinical measurements.
Further cognitive network research is required to better quantify
the semantic memory of persons with schizophrenia and how it
deviates from neurotypical controls, to better understand symp-
toms such as “loose associations”.
In summary, chaotic semantic network state allows for more
flexible creative processing, associated with the RH. While a
SWN state is a crucial aspect of neurocognitive structural and
functional organization (Bullmore and Sporns, 2012; Baronchelli
et al., 2013), an over chaotic SWN state may lead to cognitive
deficiencies, as apparent in persons suffering from schizophrenia
(Zeev-Wolf et al., 2014). As such, the semantic system must
balance between rigidity, which may disrupt creative language
processing and chaos, which may disrupt conventional, literal
language processing. Furthermore, semantic chaos may also dis-
rupt the processing of creative language, interfering with the
appropriateness and relevance aspects of creative products. Each
of these extremes thus affects the two components of the cre-
ative product—novelty (flexibility, chaos) and appropriateness
(systemized, rigidity), respectively. This balance is achieved by
integration.
SEMANTIC INTEGRATION
To avoid the extreme states of either semantic rigidity or semantic
chaos, we suggest that the neurocognitive system must strive for a
balanced dynamics in its semantic processing. On the one hand,
a highly-structured rule-based semantic system is advantageous
to the cognitive system in regard to quickly retrieving the more
conventional types of language such as literal meanings and highly
conventional metaphoric expressions. This systematic, constrain-
ing semantic relation may thus offer a processing advantage
for the rule-based semantic system of the LH. On the other
hand, when the semantic relations between words comprising a
linguistic expression are distant and unusual, such as in novel
metaphors, the rule-based semantic system of the LH may require
a complementary neural system that is able to cope with the
potential rule violations created by non-conventional semantic
combinations (Faust, 2012). These two systems must cooperate in
a balanced manner, to achieve semantic, including metaphorical,
well-being (Siegel, 2010) and to avoid extreme conditions where
one system is dominant. Such unbalanced conditions can result in
extreme rigidity, leading to an autistic-like state or extreme chaos,
leading to a schizophrenic-like state (as reviewed above). Our
notion of an interaction between a rule-based, more rigid, sys-
temized linguistic LH system and a hyper-flexible, more chaotic,
non-systemized linguistic RH system is supported by the fine
coarse model, as described above (Mirous and Beeman, 2012).
However, what might be the general neurocognitive basis for such
a sub-division?
We have recently proposed a general account for the relations
between two hemispheric systems that may support the creative
process in different modalities (Kenett et al., under review). We
suggest that creativity is not confined to the RH, but that it
is a product of a dual system interaction in a given cognitive
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domain—a specialized neurocognitive system responsible for
conventional processing and a non-specialized neurocognitive
system responsible for unconventional processing. The interac-
tion between these two systems allows for effective processing
of both conventional and unconventional stimuli and may thus
support creativity. We investigated our theory in a cognitive task
in which the RH is the specialized system, namely face processing,
in order to generalize the findings from language research to
the visual domain. Face processing has been shown to be more
typically processed by the RH (Yovel et al., 2008) thus allowing
us to investigate our account. We show how conventional, natural
faces are better processed by the specialized RH system, whereas
unconventional faces are better processed by the non-specialized
LH system (Kenett et al., under review). Furthermore, we show
how only processing of unconventional faces presented to the
non-specialized LH system is significantly positive related to
creative ability (see Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2013 for supporting neural
evidence). Thus, a well-balanced interaction between specialized
and non-specialized neurocognitive systems seems to be critical
for the efficient processing of all types of stimuli and mainly for
coping with the less conventional, creative aspects of reality.
Our theory and findings are supported by the growing amount
of research showing the importance of hemispheric communi-
cation for creativity (Razumnikova, 2007; Takeuchi et al., 2010;
Zhao et al., 2014). Takeuchi et al. (2010) have found a significant
positive correlation between the size of the corpus callosum and
creative ability. The authors interpret their findings as supporting
the idea that creativity is associated with “efficient integration
of information” through integrated white matter pathways. In
a follow up research, these authors conducted a resting state
functional imaging research to investigate gray and white mat-
ter correlation with intelligence and creativity (Takeuchi et al.,
2011). In regard to creativity, this research found a positive
significant relation between white matter and creativity, further
demonstrating the importance of white matter connectivity and
creative ability. Recently, Zhao et al. (2014) conducted a func-
tional connectivity research to examine hemispheric activation
in verbal creativity. The authors report bilateral neural pathway
activation with greater functional connectivity in the RH. It might
be argued that this intra-hemispheric activation is required for
the complex interplay between specialized and non-specialized
systems in processing conventional and unconventional stimuli
and even possibly conventional and unconventional features of a
given stimulus.
From a network perspective, classical theory on creativity has
directly related it to semantic (or associative) memory structure
(Mednick, 1962; Runco and Jaeger, 2012). Mednick’s theory of
individual differences in creativity proposes that high creative per-
sons are characterized by “flat” (broader) instead of “steep” (few)
association hierarchies (Mednick, 1962). Schilling (2005) pro-
posed a SWN theory of creative insight problem solving, suggest-
ing that insight is achieved via restructuring of semantic memory
network. Rossman and Fink (2010) found that high creative
persons give lower estimates of the distance between unrelated
word pairs as compared to less creative persons, implying that
high creative persons may have a wider, interconnected semantic
network than low creative persons. Finally, we have recently
conducted an empirical network research directly investigating
Mednick’s notion of the difference between low and high creative
persons (Kenett et al., 2014). We show how the semantic network
of low creative persons is more rigid than that of high creative
persons, thus providing empirical network support for Mednick’s
theory (but see Benedek and Neubauer, 2013 for an alternative
view). Thus, individual differences in creative ability may be con-
strained by semantic memory structure, which is in accord with
our proposed semantic continuum. In line with this notion, as the
semantic memory state is more rigid, thus it is “less creative”, till
the point of a clinical state (persons with AS). On the contrary, as
the semantic memory state is more chaotic, thus it is “more cre-
ative”, till the point of a clinical state (persons with schizophrenia).
In summary, semantic integration is crucial for semantic
well-being and seems to be implemented by hemispheric com-
munication between a specialized system and a non-specialized
system. We propose that this explanation complements the fine-
coarse semantic processing model and provides a comprehensive
account for the contradicting role of the RH in metaphor process-
ing (Faust, 2012; Rapp, 2012). Novel metaphor processing first
requires sense retrieval of the conventional parts of the metaphor
followed by a process of sense creation which links together the
remote parts of the novel metaphor unto a new meaning (Bowdle
and Gentner, 2005). Thus, activation of both hemispheres is
required—each system contributing its unique processing and
via efficient and flexible intra-hemispheric communication
achieves semantic integration. This flexible interaction dynamics
between the specialized and non-specialized systems may result
in the ability to cope with the full range of semantic processing,
including novel metaphor comprehension. However, deficient
intra-hemispheric communication can result in the extreme
states of the semantic continuum. We propose that individual
differences in the relation between the LH specialized and RH
non-specialized linguistic systems are related to differences in lex-
icon organization across the semantic continuum, as expressed in
the difference between low creative versus high creative persons.
CONCLUSIONS–THE WELL-BALANCED SEMANTIC BRAIN
We began this paper by stating that language is complex. We
propose that language is a complex semantic system with varying
types that require a delicate balance between the more rigid and
the more chaotic aspects of semantic processing, striving for
integration. This semantic integration is achieved by hemispheric
communication and structural and functional neurocognitive
connectivity. We propose a semantic continuum which ranges
from extremely rigid to extremely chaotic mental lexicon orga-
nization. We argue that such a continuum can explain different
modes of semantic processing in clinical (such as persons with AS
or Schizophrenia) populations as well as individual differences in
creative ability. We provide neural, behavioral and network sci-
ence evidence, which converge to such a neurocognitive network
continuum. Finally, we describe how different patterns of novel
metaphor processing can be explained by such a continuum and
how it reconciles between the contradicting evidence found in
regard to the role of the RH and LH in metaphor processing.
Application of graph theory in neurocognitive research in the
past two decades provided quantitative means to explore structure
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and dynamics of brain networks at all levels. So far, network
science has been mainly used to investigate neural structural
and functional networks, but such application is also growing
in the investigation of the cognitive domain (Baronchelli et al.,
2013). Network research at the neural level has identified two
key principles of neural networks: functional segregation and
integration (Bullmore and Sporns, 2012). In this paper we suggest
that these two principles are at the basis of the cognitive task
of metaphor processing: while a functional segregation of hemi-
spheric systems operates on complementary types of stimuli, only
through semantic integration is efficient metaphor processing
achieved. We suggest that analyzing such different mental lexicon
conditions which result in various communication, language and
thought conditions can greatly contribute to the research of such
conditions by bringing together seemingly unrelated findings and
conditions and providing a theoretical framework to which they
can be related.
A major direction for future research is to relate the systemized
LH and the less systemized, more flexible RH semantic systems
to the mental lexicon network. Mainly, are there dual parallel
lexicon networks which allow efficient systemized and flexible
processing? Or is there rather a general mental lexicon network
which is somehow represented at the whole brain and operated
differently by the systemized LH and flexible RH systems? While
the growing mass of evidence of hemispheric communication
during semantic processing (also supported by the FCT) seems to
support the latter, future converging network and neurocognitive
research is required to further investigate the matter. Recently,
Caeyenberghs and Leemans (2014) conducted a network based
fiber tractography analysis in order to reconstruct the LH and
RH structural networks. These authors show how the LH is
significantly more structured than the RH, whereas the RH
is more small-worlded than the LH (see Caeyenberghs and
Leemans, 2014 for a full description). Thus, these findings
provide further neural support for our theory. Further research is
needed to relate hemispheric network properties and the cognitive
mental lexicon. Finally, further network research is required to
better quantify our proposed semantic continuum. Mainly, how
can a balanced integrated semantic state be quantified in network
terms? Another such direction is the application of network
science to study lexical organization in chaotic conditions, such
as persons suffering from schizophrenia. Such research, which is
currently lacking, can further strengthen our proposed semantic
continuum and shed a unique light on this clinical condition.
Finally, as brain organization at all levels adheres to a network
organization, network science should be used to extend and
develop neurocognitive models and theories. Such addition of a
network layer to models and theories can help in restructuring
current models; provide more general accounts and empirical
predictions. The theory presented here is one such attempt.
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